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We provide a perturbed evolutionary model of matching on a graph. First, we obtain that 
maximal matchings are the singleton recurrent classes of the model without perturbations. 
Then, we apply stochastic stability analysis considering two different error models: the 
link-error model, where mistakes directly hit links, and the agent-error model, where 
mistakes hit agents’ decisions, and indirectly links. We find that stochastic stability is 
ineffective for refinement purposes in the link-error model – where all maximal matchings 
are stochastically stable – while it proves effective in the agent-error model – where all 
and only maximum matchings are stochastically stable.
© 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
There is a close relation between graph theory and matching theory. Given a graph, a matching is a set of non-adjacent
links on the graph. A maximal matching is a matching such that any added link would be adjacent to an existing link. 
A classical problem in graph theory concerning matching on a given graph is about finding a maximum matching, which is 
a matching with the highest number of links (hence, it must be a maximal matching). A variety of algorithms have been 
developed to solve this problem in polynomial time: among the most famous are the blossom algorithm (Edmonds, 1965) 
for general graphs, the Ford–Fulkerson algorithm (Ford and Fulkerson, 1956) and the Hopcroft–Karp algorithm (Hopcroft 
and Karp, 1973) for bipartite graphs. Related problems with higher computational complexity (Valiant, 1979) concern enu-
merating or counting all maximum matchings and all maximal matchings.
While all the above algorithms constitute centralized mechanisms where local information must be collected and elabo-
rated by a central planner, we propose a decentralized model that proves able to achieve analogous results. In particular, we 
consider an evolutionary setting where pairs of nodes connected in the graph, that we interpret as agents who can poten-
tially interact together, can choose to realize the link and obtain the benefits from interaction. While this simple dynamics 
is only able to achieve some maximal matching, interesting results arise when we add a tiny amount of perturbations. More 
precisely, we consider two different error models, that we call link-error model and agent-error model, and we make use of 
stochastic stability (Foster and Young, 1990; Young, 1993; Kandori et al., 1993), which gives the long-run probability of each 
✩ The results in this paper partly overlap with those in a manuscript that has previously circulated under the title “Efficiency and Stability in a Process of 
Teams Formation”. We thank for helpful comments Andrea Galeotti, Sanjeev Goyal, Matthew Jackson, Shachar Kariv, Brian Rogers, Fernando Vega-Redondo, 
Simon Weidenholzer and Leeat Yariv.
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2 L. Boncinelli, P. Pin / Games and Economic Behavior ••• (••••) •••–•••Fig. 1. On the same graph, a maximal matching is depicted on the left, and a maximum matching is depicted on the right.
matching when the likelihood of a mistake tends to zero. In the link-error model a mistake hits a link, forming or remov-
ing it despite agents’ choices. In the agent-error model, instead, a mistake hits the choice of a single agent, implying that 
two mistakes are required to form a link when both agents would prefer not to form it. We find that stochastically stable 
matchings, i.e., matchings that have a positive long-run probability, coincide with: (i) maximal matchings in the link-error 
model, (ii) maximum matchings in the agent-error model. These results suggest an approach to find all maximal and max-
imum matchings that may be of interest to computer scientists. Indeed, computer simulations can be used to calculate the 
long-run proportion of time spent in each matching when mistake probabilities are tiny: those matchings that are visited 
a non-negligible proportion of time correspond to maximal matchings in the link-error model and maximum matchings in 
the agent-error model.
Following the seminal contribution of Gale and Shapley (1962), where the celebrated deferred-acceptance algorithm is 
provided showing the existence of a stable matching (i.e., a matching such that any pair of mates cannot both be better 
off by matching together), matching is largely studied in economics in the context of the marriage problem, where agents 
are divided in two sets, and each agent has a preference order over the potential mates of the other set. Differently from 
this stream of literature, we consider a general matching problem (sometimes referred to as roommate problem, of which 
bipartite matching is a special case) and extreme preferences described by an exogenously given graph, where two agents 
are connected if they can be potential mates, and are not connected otherwise.
Decentralized matching is receiving an increasing attention in economics, starting from Roth and Vande Vate (1990), 
where it is shown that the process of allowing pairs of mutually benefiting agents to match together over time converges to 
a stable matching with probability one. In particular, there is a stream of contributions that make use of stochastic stability: 
Jackson and Watts (2002) find that all stable matchings are stochastically stable in the marriage problem, and Klaus et al. 
(2010) obtain the same result in the roommate problem. Both these papers adopt an error model where mistakes affect 
links rather than agents’ choices, with the difference that mistakes cause links to be removed in Jackson and Watts (2002), 
and to be formed in Klaus et al. (2010) (see more on this in the discussion of Section 5). Newton and Sawa (2015) consider 
a large class of mistake models in a variety of matching problems and find a necessary condition for a matching to be 
stochastically stable, namely being most robust to one-shot deviation.
The arguments in the proofs of the present paper are closely related to those in Boncinelli and Pin (2012), especially after 
a line graph transformation is applied, translating links into nodes, and adjacencies between links into links. Beyond the 
completely different issue (Boncinelli and Pin, 2012, study the contribution to local public goods by means of the best-shot 
game applied to networks), we stress that considering links instead of nodes yields substantial differences in the agent-error 
model, since a link is comprised of two agents, and link formation requires mutual consent while a single agent’s will is 
enough for link removal, which in turn implies that forming a link by mistake can be harder than removing it.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the baseline problem of matching on a graph. 
In Section 3 we provide the unperturbed dynamic model, and a first result on recurrent classes. In Section 4 we analyze 
the perturbed dynamic model, characterizing stochastically stable matchings for the link-error model and the agent-error 
model. Section 5 concludes with a brief discussion.
2. The model
Our notation is mainly based on Jackson and Watts (2002). Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a finite set of agents. We consider a 
non-directed network g where the agents in N are the nodes (or vertices). More precisely, g is a set collecting subsets of N
of size 2. A subset collecting agents i and j, i = j, is denoted with i j, and is called link i j. We interpret i j ∈ g by saying that 
agents i and j are connected in g , which means that they can potentially trade together.
A matching m is a subset of g with no adjacent links, i.e., such that if i j ∈ m and k ∈ m, then k = i =  and k = j = . 
We interpret i j ∈ m by saying that agents i and j trade together. We call trading agents the agents who belong to links 
in m, and we indicate with N(m) such a set. We denote with M the set of all matchings. We also use the notation m + i j
and m − i j to denote, respectively, m ∪ {i, j} and m \ {i, j}.
A maximal matching is a matching with the property that if i j ∈ g and i j /∈ m, then m + i j is not a matching. In other 
words, m is a maximal matching if it is not a proper subset of any other matching.
A maximum matching is a matching with the maximum number of links. Of course, a maximum matching is a maximal 
matching, but the converse is in general false (as illustrated by Fig. 1).
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Time is discrete and denoted with t = 0, 1, 2, . . .. At time t , if the existing matching is m, then every agent i ∈ N(m)
earns a payoff equal to 1, and every agent i ∈ N \ N(m) earns a payoff equal to 0.
The matching m′ at time t + 1 is determined starting from the matching m at time t as follows. One link i j ∈ g is 
randomly drawn for revision. If i j /∈m, then such a link can be formed. If agent i /∈ N(m), then i will get a payoff of 1 if the 
link is formed, and a payoff of 0 if he remains unmatched. Thus, he will choose to form the link. If i ∈ N(m), then ik ∈ m
for some k ∈ N , and i will get a payoff of 1 both if link ik is severed and link i j is formed, and if link i j is not formed and 
link ik remains in place. We suppose that the decision to sever a link requires a small cost c > 0 to be paid. Therefore, in 
this case agent i will choose not to form link i j. A similar analysis applies to agent j. The link i j will be formed if and only 
if both i and j choose to form it (that is, mutual consent is needed for link creation).
If i j ∈ m, then such a link can in principle be removed, if at least one between i and j is intended to do so (that is, 
mutual consent is needed for link maintenance). Since both i ∈ N(m) and j ∈ N(m), each of them earns 1 if link i j is not 
removed, while earning −c if link i j is intentionally removed. Therefore, both i and j will never choose to sever link i j.
We stress that no existing link will ever be removed, neither directly nor indirectly as the result of link creation.
We consider the Markov chain (M, T ), where M is the state space (i.e., the set of all matchings) and T is the resulting 
transition matrix. In particular, Tmm′ gives the probability that m′ is reached at time t + 1 if m is the matching at time t .
A subset C ⊆ M is a recurrent class of (M, T ) if: (i) for every m ∈ C and m′ ∈ M \ C , we have that Tmm′ = 0, and (ii) C is 
a minimal (non-empty) set with respect to the property in (i). The following lemma characterizes the recurrent classes 
of (M, T ).
Lemma 1. C is a recurrent class of (M, T ) if and only if C = {m} with m a maximal matching.
Proof. For the if statement. Since existing links are never removed, the only possibility to leave a matching is if an addi-
tional link is created, but this is impossible by definition if m is a maximal matching. Hence, property (i) holds. Since {m}
is a singleton, it is clearly minimal with respect to such property, and so property (ii) holds as well.
For the only if statement. If m is not a maximal matching, then there exists a link i j such that m + i j ∈ M . This implies 
that both i /∈ N(m) and j /∈ N(m). Hence, if link i j is drawn at time t , it will be created since profitable for both i and j. Now, 
either m + i j is a maximal matching, or the above reasoning can be applied again. Since the state space is finite, a maximal 
matching is hence reachable with positive probability in a finite number of times, which completes the proof. 
4. Perturbed dynamics
We apply stochastic stability to check whether our predictions can be refined beyond maximal matchings.
We take into consideration two different error models. We call the first one link-error model. At every time, with prob-
ability 1 −  the result of the revision of the randomly drawn link i j is exactly the same as in the unperturbed dynamics. 
With probability  , instead, the revision of link i j gives the opposite result.
We also take into consideration another error model, which we call agent-error model. At every time, with probability 
1 −  the choice of agent i is exactly the same as in the unperturbed dynamics. With probability  , instead, the choice of 
agent i is the opposite. The same occurs to agent j, in an independent manner.
The substantial difference between the two error models concerns the case of link creation. The formation of a new 
link on which there is not mutual consent always requires one mistake (i.e., it occurs with probability of order ) in the 
link-error model, while in the agent-error model it requires one mistake if only one agent is not willing to create the link, 
and two mistakes (i.e., it occurs with probability of order 2) if both agents are not willing to create the link.
Both error models yield, for every  > 0, a Markov chain that is irreducible, i.e., has a unique recurrent class, and 
aperiodic, i.e., there exists a time after which the system can be at any state with positive probability. This in turn implies 
that there exists a unique invariant distribution that describes both the fraction of time spent and the probability to be 
exactly on each state after a very long time has elapsed, irrespectively of the initial state.
The limit of the invariant distribution for  going to 0 is shown to exist (Young, 1993), and the states that receive positive 
probability in such a limit distribution are called stochastically stable states.
We invite the reader who is interested in a formal exposition of perturbed Markov chain theory to consult Young (1993)
and Ellison (2000), while in the following we simply make use of the resistance function r : M × M → R+ ∪ {∞}, where 
r(m, m′) indicates the minimum number of mistakes required to move from m to m′ in one unit of time. If r(m, m′) = 0 then 
the system moves from m to m′ with positive probability in the unperturbed dynamics, i.e., Tmm′ > 0, while r(m, m′) = ∞
is interpreted as impossibility of moving from m to m′ in one unit of time even when mistakes are allowed.
We rely on the techniques and results illustrated in Young (1993) and Young (1998), as they provide a relatively easy 
way to identify which states are stochastically stable. More precisely, we restrict attention to maximal matchings, since there 
are no other recurrent states by virtue of Lemma 1, and for any pair (m, m′) of maximal matchings we define r∗(m, m′) as 
the minimum sum of the resistances between matchings over any path starting in m and ending in m′ . Then, for any 
maximal matching m, we define an m-tree as a tree having root at m and all maximal matchings as nodes. The resistance 
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minimum resistance over all trees rooted at m.
A state m is stochastically stable if and only if m has minimum stochastic potential in the set of maximal matchings. 
Intuitively, stochastic stability selects those states that are easiest to reach from other states, with “easiest” interpreted as 
requiring the fewest mistakes (as measured by the stochastic potential).
Our results are stated in the following two propositions.
Proposition 2. In the link-error model, a matching is stochastically stable if and only if it is a maximal matching.
Proof. It is enough to show that, for any pair of maximal matchings (m, m′), with m = m′ , we can find a sequence of 
maximal matchings (m, m1, . . . , mk, m′) such that the resistance between two consecutive matchings in the sequence is 
equal to 1, i.e., r∗(m, m1) = r∗(m1, m2) = . . . = r∗(mk−1, mk) = r∗(mk, m′) = 1. We consider the set of links that exist in m′
and do not exist in m, i.e., m′ \m. Since m =m′ , we have that m′ \m = ∅. With positive probability a link i j ∈m′ \m is drawn 
for revision, and by means of a single mistake such a link is formed, so that a new matching m˜ is reached. We note that 
some other link in m is removed when link i j is formed: either a link involving agent i, or a link involving agent j, or both 
kinds of link. However, removed links cannot exist in m′ , since those links are adjacent to link i j, and link i j ∈m′ . Therefore, 
m′ \ m˜ = (m′ \ m) + i j. If m˜ is not a maximal matching, then with positive probability a maximal matching mˆ is reached 
in a finite number of periods without mistakes, by Lemma 1. Since existing links are never removed in the unperturbed 
dynamics, we can conclude that m′ \ mˆ = (m′ \m) + i j. In any case, we have moved from m to another maximal matching, 
call it m1, by means of a single mistake, which means that r∗(m, m1) = 1. If m1 =m′ we are done, otherwise we can repeat 
the above step until m′ is reached, with the total number of steps being equal to |m′ \m|, and all steps requiring a single 
mistake. 
As a comment to Proposition 2, we remark that stochastic stability, which is typically employed as a refinement criterion 
in evolutionary game theory, has no bite in our setting if the link-error model is adopted, since all matchings that belong 
to recurrent classes of the unperturbed dynamics turn out to be stochastically stable.
The efficacy of stochastic stability for refinement purposes is restored if the agent-error model is adopted, as shown in 
Proposition 3.
Proposition 3. In the agent-error model, a matching is stochastically stable if and only if it is a maximum matching.
Proof. We take a pair of maximal matchings (m, m′). We consider the set of links that exist in m and do not exist in m′ , 
i.e., m \m′. First we show that r∗(m, m′) ≤ |m \m′|. Indeed, a first link i j ∈m \m′ is drawn for revision, and a single mistake 
involving either agent i or agent j is enough to remove the link. If (m \m′) − i j = ∅, at the following period another link in 
(m \m′) − i j is drawn for revision, and again a single mistake is enough to remove it. This procedure lasts |m \m′| periods, 
clearing set m \m′ by means of exactly |m \m′| mistakes. Finally, we simply note that, once all links in m \m′ have been 
removed, links in m′ \m can be formed in the unperturbed dynamics.
Then, we show that r∗(m, m′) ≥ |m \m′|. Consider a generic path of matchings starting from m and ending in m′ . If m1
and m2 are two consecutive matchings in the path, and if |m \ m′| decreases moving from m1 to m2, then one of the 
following two occurrences must happen. (i) Link i j ∈ m1 is drawn for revision and removed. In this case, at least one 
mistake must be made (by either i or j), and |m \ m′| gets reduced at most by 1. (ii) Link i j /∈ m1 is drawn for revision 
and formed. In this other case, if only one mistake is made, then only one agent between i and j is trading at m1, which 
means that one link is removed and hence |m \m′| gets reduced at most by 1; if two mistakes are made, then both i and j
are trading at m1, which means that two links are removed and hence |m \m′| gets reduced at most by 2. In any case, the 
reduction in |m \m′| cannot exceed the number of mistakes.
Therefore:
r∗(m,m′) = |m \m′| = |m| − |m ∩m′|. (1)
We are ready to prove that a stochastically stable matching is a maximum matching. We proceed by showing that a maximal 
matching m that is not a maximum matching cannot be stochastically stable. Since m is not a maximum matching, we can 
find a maximal matching m′ such that |m′| > |m|. Take any m-tree and consider the path in the tree from m′ to m, say 
(m′, m1, . . . , mi, . . . , mk, m). By (1), the sum of resistances over this path is |m′| − |m′ ∩ m1| + |m1| − |m1 ∩ m2| + . . . +
|mk−1| − |mk−1 ∩mk| + |mk| − |mk ∩m|. We now consider the m′-tree obtained from the m-tree by reversing the path from 
m′ to m. Again by (1), the sum of resistances over this reversed path is |m| − |m ∩mk| + |mk| − |mk ∩mk−1| + . . . + |m2| −
|m2 ∩m1| +|m1| −|m1 ∩m′|. Taking the difference between the above sums of resistances over the two paths, we obtain that 
the m′-tree has a resistance which is equal to the resistance of the m-tree +|m| − |m′|. Since |m′| > |m|, we can conclude 
that for any m-tree we can find an m′-tree with a lower overall resistance, and hence the stochastic potential of m′ is lower 
than the stochastic potential of m. Therefore, m cannot be stochastically stable.
We now prove that a maximum matching is stochastically stable. Since at least one stochastically stable matching must 
exist, and we have just seen that maximal matchings that are not maximum matchings cannot be stochastically stable, we 
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matching m′ . Following exactly the same reasoning as above we obtain that the stochastic potential of m′ must be the same 
as the stochastic potential of m. Therefore, m′ is stochastically stable as well. 
5. Discussion
In this paper we have considered error models where both link creation and link removal are allowed by mistake. Here 
we provide a brief discussion for the cases in which the error model allows either link removal only or link creation only, 
drawing a comparison with the cases dealt with in this paper; this also helps an intuitive understanding of our results. 
Suppose that a mistake can only cause an existing link to be removed. Take agents i and j such that i j ∈ g , and consider a 
matching m where i, j ∈ N(m). We observe that 2 mistakes are required to reach a matching m′ where i and j are matched 
together, since both current matches of i and j must be removed. This same result holds if we assume that a mistake can 
also cause a link to be formed, provided that the agent-error model is used, since both agents prefer not to form the link, so 
that 2 mistakes are still required. If, instead, we suppose that a mistake can only cause a link to be formed then 1 mistake 
is enough to have that i and j can be matched together, which is the same that happens if the link-error model is used. 
We also observe that the reverse passage from m′ to m requires 1 mistake irrespectively of the error model (it is enough 
that link i j is removed, which is allowed in any of the error models considered). This argument suggests that in our setting 
the passage from a matching to another matching with fewer links requires more mistakes then the reverse passage if we 
use an error model where mistakes can only cause links to be removed, and the same reasoning applies to the agent-error 
model as well; this intuitively leads to the result that maximum matchings are stochastically stable for both error models. 
Instead, when we consider either an error model where mistakes can only cause links to be formed, or the link-error model, 
both passages require 1 mistake, so that intuitively stochastic stability is ineffective for selection purposes.
The above observation facilitates the comparison between our results and similar results in the literature. Indeed, the 
difference between our findings in case of the agent-error model and the findings in Jackson and Watts (2002), where only 
link removal is allowed by mistake, can not driven by the error model, hence it must be driven by agents’ preferences. If 
agents have strict preferences over mates, as it is assumed by Jackson and Watts (2002), then stochastic stability has no 
bite for equilibrium selection. If instead, as we assume, each agent has a set of mates with whom he can fruitfully interact, 
and possible mates are perfect substitutes one of the other (so that agents never change mate intentionally, because of a 
tiny switching cost), then the role of stochastic stability as an equilibrium selection device is restored, and only maximum 
matchings are selected. Things are different if we compare our findings in case of the link-error model with those in Klaus 
et al. (2010), where only link creation is allowed by mistake: indeed, we can note that here the different assumption on 
agents’ preferences (Klaus et al., 2010, assume strict preferences as well) does not lead to any significant difference in the 
stochastic stability analysis, which proves ineffective in both cases as equilibrium selection device.
We think that the stark assumption on agents’ preferences that we have used in the model can be a fair approximation 
in a number of real cases, with the exogenously given graph representing, for instance, skill complementary or geographical 
proximity. However, our results would be of limited applicability if they crucially rested on agents treating neighbors in the 
graph as perfect substitutes. Here we will briefly argue how to extend our analysis by relaxing such an assumption. The 
payoff that agent i earns to trade with agent j, with link i j ∈ g , is now equal to 1 + vij . Suppose that maxi j∈g |vij | < 1. 
Suppose also that the cost to be paid to remove a link is c > maxi j∈g,ik∈g(vij − vik). Then, once a link is formed, agents 
would never prefer to remove it to be matched with a better mate, since the benefit is not worth the cost to exit the 
existing relationship. In such a setting, all our results would be maintained.
Furthermore, we note that in our model, for each agent i, we treat agents who are not possible mates of i as unfeasible, 
meaning that a link i j /∈ g can never be formed, even by mistake. We stress that such an assumption is not crucial for our 
results. Indeed, we can slightly adjust the model to accommodate the case when i j /∈ g is not unfeasible, but simply worse 
than remaining unmatched (it is enough to give a negative payoff to both agents if linked together); such unprofitable links 
will never be formed voluntarily, and if formed by mistake they will be removed as soon as the agents have the opportunity, 
provided that c is small enough. Our results easily extend to this case as well.
Finally, we want to stress that we have made no assumption on the graph describing which links can be formed. This 
means that our analysis applies if we restrict attention to bipartite graphs, for which a number of specific results are 
available in the literature, such as the Hall’s theorem (Hall, 1935). In the context of marriage, where agents are divided in 
two sets, say women and men, the Hall’s theorem states that a perfect matching (i.e., a matching where no agent remains 
uncoupled) exists if and only if the following condition holds: for every subset of women, the set of men who are considered 
acceptable by at least a woman in the subset is at least as numerous as the subset of women. We conclude by highlighting 
that we can combine our results with the Hall’s theorem, and possibly other theorems for bipartite graphs, to obtain new, 
potentially interesting, implications. As an example, we note that all and only perfect matchings are stochastically stable in 
the agent-error model if and only if the condition of the Hall’s theorem is satisfied.
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